Pan-Qualism Explained

by Bizarro Guidepost

I am fairly confident that in some other world in some other universe, beings who are like humans in every single way save their floppy rabbit ears and sporadic bursts of violent flatulence have been arguing in a language that, by a strange coincidence, is exactly the same as English. I am nearly certain of this as long as there are an infinite number of universes (this is a certainty persuant to argument 3.a.9z).

These rabbits were discussing their experience of perceived feel, qualia, of undeniable shining reality. They exist now and they know they exist through the immediacy and substance of their experience. One rabbit conjuncted this knowledge with the scientific notion that the universe is composed of one basic building block known as a hoop, and that, therefore, each of these building-blocks of existence must contain the constituents of qualia, that is, perceived feel.

That is, he argued, if we all have feelings and are made of one substance, that substance must itself have feeling, or be an essence of feeling. That is, not an awareness but an experience in all things, a "pan-qualism" sans spiritual belief... Being in all things! But was it really so? One rabbit would have none of this new-agey idiocy. “Ah! But the whole is greater than the sum of its parts!” Silence fell on the room as the air thickened with prolonged tension. The Tricentennial Pan-Qualic-Convention of Speculative Philosophers was widely recognized as the most significant, monumentous, prestigious and otherwise lofty-worded debate in the entire Lagoverse, so this was a serious matter.

Another rabbit broke the standstill. "The pan-qualist argument is right in a limited sense but forgets that the parts still exist; the constituents of qualia must exist if qualia is real at all, and qualia is real because we perceive it!" Everyone glared at him like he was insane -- had he never heard of epiphenomena? -- so he slumped back down. Fringe philosphers.

Rabbit custom demanded that the burden of socially disgraceful behavior must be shared by an onlooker, so Larry the Massochistic Stoner Rabbit spryly leaped to his feet and proclaimed, "Duuuuuuuude!" It was deathly inappropriate for a tricentenial convocation, and he was applauded by the other rabbits for his dignity and grace. Yet another rabbit raised his voice: "But no other explanation reconciles the existence of my consciousness with the apparent materialism of reality!" By this time, the rabbits could not help but murmur amongst themselves and the entire procession was very dramatic.

"You're missing the whole point," said the mayor of Rabittown as he decisively rose to his feet, leaning against his cane with authority. "This very argument assumes qualia can be quantified! Why, that's a contradiction in terms!" A sycophant reaffirmed, "It's incoherent! Incoherent!" The secretary sprung forward to restore order as a chanting of "Incoherent! Incoherent!" began to fill the halls. The secratary commanded their respect, as well as their fax and printer. The trifecta won their attention immediately. "Persuant to argument 12.q.1, the bearer of the Cane and Top-Hat is by fiat of natural law Mayor of Rabittown and Sole Arbiter of Objective Truth!"

"Fight for the cane! Rabbitpile for the cane!" shouted one of the rabbits, and they all leapt into a great heap, at the center of which was the Mayor of Rabbittown, who was crushed and exploded instantly. Unfortunately, during all of the rubbing, biting, and scratching, the rabbits became terribly horny. A variety of unsavory things then happened, the likes of which are 3-neither work safe nor palatable nor will be described here.

The end.

Searching for secular altruism

For a long time, I have had a privately held philosophy that I have refrained from sharing with other people out of the fear that they would think I'm a bit crazy. It all stems from my belief that my ethical system ought to be completely universifiable, that is, applied fairly to all rational agents in an equal way, in an effort to create some ideal "perfectly universifiable" system. When I jot the arguments down, I will (most likely) have two premises:

1.) Morality is subjective in a special sense. It is not completely arbitrary; however, what is good is relative to what its perceiver interprets as good.
2.) Any ethical system still must be universifiable.

I believe these premises ultimately lead to the following conclusions, though I have yet to share my arguments and what I believe may change:

i.) If the golden rule is, "Do unto others as you wish to be done unto you," this system upholds a new "better golden rule": "Do unto others as they wish to be done unto them." We'll just call this rephrasing of the rule the golden rule.
ii.) But remember, one's morality must be universifiable to be coherent. This applies to you and I both. To be ethical and universifiable, one must want by being ethical a.) what is valued by them and, by making that ethic universal, b.) what is valued by others for others. (note to self: No other hypothetical moral system can be made universally equitable so effectively).
iii.) When two rational agents encounter a situation in which the golden rule cannot be upheld for both of them due to physical constraints, they should approximate it as well as possible in a way that is equitable and fair.
iv.) As far as a person does not act equitably by upholding the golden rule, they are not behaving as ethical agents. A person who completely ignores this rule, e.g., a sociopath, is not an ethical agent and as such does not have value. The sociopath should not be punished or rewarded but merely treated as part of a system and either dealt with expediently or exploited without prejudice.
iv.) Thus, to the extent that someone wishes good to be done unto them, and universalizes that desire, or believes in such, they are valued, and worthy of receiving good treatment;
v.) And to the extent others do not, they are not assigned negative value but are merely awarded no value.